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Justice as a secondary moral ideal: the British idealists and the personal ethics 
perspective in understanding social justice
1
 
 
Maria Dimova-Cookson 
 
Paper published in EJPT, 10 (1) 2011, 46-70 
 
The topic of social justice is not directly associated with the British idealists. Issues 
about which we more habitually seek their wisdom include citizenship, the role of the 
state, the common good, moral character or self-realisation. With respect to the post-
Rawlsian dichotomy ‘justice versus virtue’ we tend to see the British idealists as the 
philosophers who engage with virtue. However, they do have a distinctive 
contribution on social justice. Certain aspects of this contribution are already well 
recognised, while some still await recognition. David Boucher has emphasised the 
difference between the post-Rawlsian approaches to justice which focus on fairness, 
impartiality, mutual benefit, desert and entitlement, on the one hand, and the British 
idealist understanding of justice as a theory that rests upon the metaphysics of the 
person and a definite conception of the good, on the other.
2
 With respect to justice, the 
British idealists focus not so much on procedures and impartiality, but on substantive 
visions of social and personal good. In addition to being different, on Boucher’s 
account, the British idealists’ theory of justice overcomes certain dualisms that seem 
to dominate contemporary analytical political theory, most importantly, the ‘justice-
virtue’ dualism.3 Simhony has demonstrated the capacity of Green’s rights theory to 
overcome the liberal anxieties about the British idealist teleological conception of 
rights. If anything, she argues, Green’s theory has the resources for a constructive 
critique of liberalism itself, challenging its assumption that a teleological conception 
of rights subverts the primary normative role of rights because teleological rights are 
supposed to be derivative, not fundamental.
4
 In other words, Green’s theory of rights 
not only defies liberal anxieties but also reveals the complex nature of liberalism. 
 2 
Gaus demonstrates a connection between Green’s ‘rights recognition thesis’ and 
moral internalism.
5
 
 
This paper will seek to show the advantages of the personal ethics perspective 
employed by the British idealist in the analysis of justice. From the personal ethics 
point of view, there is a moral paradox at the heart of justice. This paradox, implied 
by Green and clearly spelled out by Bosanquet, is to do with the observation that from 
the standpoint of the moral agent, the claims for justice are counterintuitive. Justice is 
what the state or society owes to the individual, but the individual, as a moral agent, 
thinks of his duties first and of his entitlements second. Justice is important but it is, in 
the philosophical analysis of Bosanquet, even of Green, a secondary moral ideal.
6
 
Bosanquet explains why ‘it is in a sense, the lowest of social claims’.7 The paradox 
has a solution that is partly articulated by Green and partly through some additional 
reconstruction of his moral theory. We will see that Green’s and Bosanquet’s moral 
philosophy leads us, through a longer path, to the philosophical grounds we already 
occupy today: those of thinking about human rights as fundamental, not derivative, 
i.e. thinking about justice as a primary, not secondary moral ideal. The paper will 
recommend the advantages of this longer path.  
 
There are three related yet distinct philosophical claims here. First, the British 
idealists saw very clearly the stand off between justice and virtue. The moral paradox 
implied in the claim for justice, as revealed by Bosanquet, is triggered by articulating 
a stand off between ‘simple individualistic justice’ and ‘the imperative of public 
welfare’.8 The significance of this can be appreciated against the fact that Rawls’s 
articulation of the dilemma between the right and the good, strongly related to that of 
 3 
between justice and virtue, is considered one of the greatest achievements of the 
twentieth century political philosophy.
9
 Secondly, the personal ethics of Green and 
Bosanquet, underpinned by their philosophy of moral action, with some 
reconstruction offered here, outlines the way in which this stand off can be resolved 
without undermining its significance. In other words, the moral philosophy
10
 of the 
British idealist contains resources for the construction of an acceptable for us - the 
‘post - UN Declaration of human rights’ generations - justification of the social ideal 
of justice. Thirdly, the perspective of personal ethics is beneficial for resolving some 
of the difficulties surrounding the implementation of social justice: the difficulties 
arising from the limits of state institutions to effect social justice. Therefore the paper 
will start with an outline of a particular conception of social justice. This conception 
will serve as a background against which the significance of the Green’s and 
Bosanquet’s theories of justice can be appreciated.  
 
The conception of social justice outlined in section one will differ from the Rawlsian 
one, but it will still be a contemporary one to the extent that it builds on Philip Pettit’s 
neorepublican theory of freedom. The section will anticipate the ways in which the 
personal ethics perspective of the British idealists would be useful in resolving some 
of the problems we face in the pursuit of social justice. Section two looks at 
Bosanquet’s theory of justice and the philosophical paradox of proclaiming justice as 
a moral ideal. In this context we look at the nature and implications of the British 
idealists’ moral philosophy and reveal the extent to which it defies our standard 
perception of it as a philosophy that conflates the personal and the common good. 
Section three turns to Green’s theory of rights, reveals the similarity and the 
differences between the two idealists, and takes the analysis of their moral theory a 
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step further. Sections four and five explore the potentials of the idealists’ 
understanding of justice to resolve the dilemmas it uncovered and to offer solution to 
problems which the institutional approach to justice cannot resolve. 
 
1. Social Justice in general and the role of the personal ethics approach 
 
More broadly, the idea of social justice implies the understanding that there are 
systematic sources of legitimate advantage and illegitimate disadvantage for 
individuals in virtue of their status of members of particular collective categories like 
race, gender or class, for example.
11
 More specifically, the conception of social justice 
that will be advanced here builds on the implications of Pettit’s neorepublican theory 
of freedom. If we accept the normative and sociological analysis behind Pettit’s 
definition of freedom as non-domination, we will be able to engage with a conception 
of justice along the following lines.
12
 Social justice aims to redress social injustice 
where the latter is seen as unequal access to power resources that allows one social 
group to dominate another. We can plausibly argue that the same thing which causes 
unfreedom, according to Pettit, that is, domination, also causes social injustice. 
 
Perceived in this way, the purpose of social justice is to redress the injustices caused 
by the existing social inequalities. In particular, social inequalities that result in a 
domination of one social group over another, when such domination can be 
potentially used to oppress. Social inequality is based on unequal access to resources 
which gives one social group power that can be used to exploit another social group. 
Pettit argues that the nature of the resources by virtue of which some may have power 
over others vary and these resources include ‘physical strength, technical advantage, 
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financial clout, political authority, social connections, communal standing, 
informational access, ideological position, cultural legitimation’ among others.13 
 
Social justice is about social equality.
14
 And equality is understood as equal access to 
the type of power that has caused social injustice. For example, let us say that we have 
accepted an argument to the effect that, in a specified context, gender inequality is 
based on different access to material and cultural resources, but not on different 
access to legal resources. Then, in order to address the social injustice of gender 
inequality, we will have to pursue equality only of those resources that are the cause 
of the imbalanced power relation. The first step in addressing issues of social injustice 
is to identify those groups that suffer oppression. We can borrow examples from 
Pettit’s neorepublican theory: practices of oppression can be found in the relations 
between employers and employees, men and women, insiders and outsiders, members 
of dominant versus members of minority cultures. 
 
This understanding of social justice can also be called a binary understanding in view 
of the fact that it singles out two social groups: the oppressed and the oppressors. This 
qualification has particular significance in the context of my intention to mark the role 
of the personal ethics approach employed by the British idealists.  
 
David Miller usefully highlights two general approaches towards social injustice: the 
institutional and the personal ethics approach. For him, the personal ethics approach 
focuses on one’s personal duties and deals with a question of the following kind. 
What am I, as an individual, bound to do for my fellow citizens?
15
 If I am disturbed 
by the social injustice in my society, is there anything that I, personally can do? By 
 6 
contrast, an institutional approach would focus on the government and other public 
organisations, and seek the best institutional arrangements that will bring ‘fair 
allocation of rights, opportunities, resources and so forth’.16 Miller concludes that we 
should draw on the two approaches, yet the institutional approach is preferable. This 
seems to be the position of Pettit as well. He gives us a good account of the type of 
policies that can tackle and overcome relationships of oppression.
17
 
 
The personal ethics perspective to social justice receives less attention in 
contemporary liberal political theory.
18
 Pettit, in particular, acknowledges the 
importance of the civic virtue route to the protection of republican freedom, and by 
implication, to the pursuit of social justice, but he treats it as of secondary importance. 
  
Here is a suggestion about how the personal ethics approach could be employed in the 
service of social justice. If the institutional approach is exemplified by the use of 
policies aiming to overcome relations of oppression, the personal ethics approach 
would resort to a direct appeal to these groups who wittingly or unwittingly are in 
possession of excessive, potentially oppressive power resources. These groups can be 
asked to voluntarily devolve their powers. For example, men should be aware that 
women are in a socially more vulnerable position and therefore they should 
voluntarily share the domestic and childcare duties. The dominant culture of a nation 
state should allocate financial resources to minority cultures so that the latter could 
maintain their existence. 
 
The institutional approach to social justice relies on the capacity of institutions to 
occupy impartial ground and therefore successfully identify social inequalities, as 
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well as on their possession of sufficient power to redress effectively those 
inequalities. There are obvious limitations in both of these aspects. Public officials or 
civil servants are often themselves members of one or indeed several oppressive 
social groups which is an obstacle to their impartial judgement. There are also limits 
to the power a government has, for example, to redress material inequalities: the 
capacity of either right or left wing governments to raise taxes is notoriously little. A 
personal ethics approach would be useful in speaking directly to the parties 
concerned. An argument can be made that justice is not only in the hands of public 
institutions but also in the hands of those whose possession of potentially oppressive 
power causes the social injustice. The personal ethics of the British idealists provides 
us with the philosophy that would speak directly to those people. 
 
The very fact that distributive justice plays such a prominent role in the post-Rawlsian 
discussions of justice reveals the extent to which the institutional approach has 
become predominant. Discussions of fair distribution, however, imply that all is in the 
hands of one agency equally related to all and already committed to being fair: some 
type of ideal government that exists above social disparities and possesses more 
power than the dominant groups of its society. Social justice, I would argue, is better 
understood as a binary relationship between two groups – that of the oppressors and 
that of the oppressed. The state can mediate this binary relationship with the purpose 
of strengthening the position of the oppressed. But the state – particularly a state that 
commits to liberal values – is restricted in its capacity to force the group of the 
‘oppressors’ to follow its policies aiming to introduce social justice. Apart from 
lacking sufficient power, a liberal state would not find it ideologically acceptable to 
overrule the will of those, who as members of a particular social relationship possess 
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potentially oppressive power. The subsequent analysis of Green’s and Bosanquet’s 
theories of justice will demonstrate the capacity of their personal ethics to deal with 
binary relations. More specifically it will give us an insight into the type of 
transaction that occurs in the process of achieving social equality. 
 
Let me conclude this section which aims to provide a framework rather than an 
elaborate argument. I have outlined a binary conception of justice where injustice is 
seen as an unequal access to power resources which allows one social group to 
dominate another. This conception mimics Pettit’s definition of neorepublican 
freedom where unfreedom is caused by those whose possession of dominating powers 
allows them to interfere arbitrarily with other people’s lives. Such an understanding of 
justice invites us to see the state as a medium through which justice can be performed 
rather than as the agency that performs it through its institutions. Justice is a matter of 
a new relationship between oppressors and oppressed where power resources are 
being reallocated. If we can see social justice in terms of a relationship, we can see 
how personal ethics can fit in. Even if we are discussing relations between groups and 
not persons, the first person point of view, characteristic of personal ethics, is of 
obvious relevance here. 
 
One could legitimately ask why the British idealists, and Green and Bosanquet in 
particular, should be seen as exponents of personal ethics, given the fact of the 
significant role institutions play in their political theories.
19
 Wouldn’t we be giving 
them one-sided portrayal and ultimately undermine, as opposed to enhance as 
intended here, the potential of their political philosophy to engage with issues of 
social justice? The comprehensive answer is that they did both and their political 
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theory is that much bettor for it. Tyler’s recent analysis of Green as ‘a radical 
republican’ makes the point that the British idealist demonstrated that virtues and 
institutions are ‘mutually sustaining and promoting rather than being arranged in 
some stable causal relationship (where the presence of one is the pre-condition of the 
existence of the other, but not vice versa)’.20 The less comprehensive answer, which 
should be sufficient for the purposes of this paper, is that the personal ethics approach 
is a prominent feature of the work of the British idealists. This approach is revealed 
by their focus on moral character and moral disposition; by their understanding of 
morality as premised on the right type of intention and not on the outward result of an 
action; by the fact that their moral philosophy has been defined as ‘moral 
psychology’21, as ‘phenomenological’22 and as representative of ‘moral internalism’.23 
 
2. Bosanquet on justice: why justice is a secondary virtue 
 
T.H. Green discusses justice in a few sections of  Prolegomena to Ethics
24
 but it is his 
theory of rights, often brought to light in contemporary research on human rights,
25
 
that gives us a more comprehensive understanding of his ideas of justice. This theory 
of rights will be addressed in the next section, and the way it underpins an 
understanding of social justice will be the object of the last two sections. Unlike the 
case of Green, the topic of justice receives a good deal of explicit attention by 
Bosanquet. A factor that explains this difference is the significant change of the social 
environment in Britain in the time between Green and Bosanquet: between the late 
1870s and early 1880s when Green gave his lectures on political obligation and the 
events of 1915, which Bosanquet discusses in his Social and International Ideals. The 
issue of justice acquired some prominence in political debates and this prominence 
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was linked to the increasing influence of socialist ideas. The fact that, unlike Green, 
Bosanquet discusses justice directly, reflects this change in political climate. 
Bosanquet gave a lecture on ‘Justice’ which was subsequently published as a part of a 
chapter ‘Three Lectures on Social Ideals’.26 As the introduction to the three lectures 
reveals, the context of Bosanquet’s discussion of justice is the polemic generated by a 
working class articulating its own demands.
27
 The members of the working class have 
started to ‘claim their own function, their own culture, their own duty, their own 
ambitions for a worthy and influential life’.28 The working class or its spokesmen are 
seeing these claims as part and parcel of a fight for ‘justice’. This is the political 
backdrop to Bosanquet’s very philosophical discussion of the nature of justice. His 
aims are to uncover what is distinctive about the demand for justice and the place of 
this demand among our other social ideals and necessities.  
 
Bosanquet quickly comes to his main point: justice is very important, yet less so than 
other social ideas, like the public good, political efficiency, safety, love or mercy. The 
comparison with the social ideals of public welfare, for example, places justice in a 
secondary position. There are three steps in this argument. The first is identifying 
justice as an ‘individualistic’ social ideal. The second step is uncovering an opposition 
between individualistic and public social ideals. This in itself is enough to reveal that 
the place of justice is only secondary. So, a third step is the claim that public virtues 
like love, mercy and service to the common good always come first. There is also a 
fourth, final step, the justification of the social ideal of justice. In the course of this 
discussion I turn to a particular common aspect of Green’s and Bosanquet’s moral 
philosophy: that service to the common good overrides in significance one’s 
engagement with her narrowly perceived personal good. This, for some controversial, 
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feature of their moral philosophy substantiates further the claim that justice is a 
secondary social ideal. This feature is rather important as it plays part both in the 
making and the resolving of the paradox. Let me give some more detail about each of 
these steps. 
 
Bosanquet’s conclusion that justice is individualistic is rather swift. It is based simply 
on the observation that justice is what the state or the society does for individuals. 
‘Justice lies in impartial distribution of advantages and disadvantages to individuals. 
In that sense it is “individualistic”.’29 We could take issue with Bosanquet and argue 
that the fact that justice is aimed at individuals, does not necessarily make it 
‘individualistic’. We are rather well versed in the language of human rights and 
therefore able to argue that treating each individual in a fair manner is part of the 
public good. However, sometimes exaggeration helps to emphasise a point. Justice is 
a type of social ideal where the individual is a direct beneficiary of the recommended 
social practice. Other social ideals, like national prosperity for example, benefit 
individuals indirectly. To give credence to Bosanquet’s position, we could say that the 
very language of justice is a language of giving individuals their due, a language of 
claims for fair treatments made by individuals. The emphasis is on entitlements not on 
duties, on receiving, not on giving.
30
 
 
The next step is the most important one, as it already anticipates the conclusion of 
subordinating justice to the service of public good. This is the step of articulating the 
opposition between the two kinds of social ideals: justice on the one side, and social 
ideals based on service to others, on the other side. 
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So we find that practically there is a recognised opposition between 
the maxims of common Justice – the general rule of equal treatment 
of individuals – and the maxims of political efficiency or the public 
good or safety, or love, or mercy – anything in which the individual 
is absorbed. …[When you demand justice you are] thinking of 
yourselves as separate particular individuals making claims, you 
have only a very imperfect apprehension of what you are.
31
 
 
Justice as the ‘rule of equal treatment of individuals’ contrasts with ‘maxims of 
political efficiency’ because, in the context of the first, the individual is a claimant, 
and in the context of the second the individual is a benefactor. When we demand 
justice and when we do our share in maximising public welfare we wear two different 
hats. 
 
Once we become aware of the opposition between justice and the other social ideals, 
we are then faced with the inferiority of justice. The ideal of justice pulls in the 
opposite direction to ideals of public service. Instead of focusing our efforts on our 
duties, we are being distracted by the demand to acquire what is believed to be our 
due. The above quotation takes us to Bosanquet’s philosophy of human agency: a 
philosophy according to which the individual in his isolation from society is 
profoundly incomplete. 
 
A general outline of Green’s and Bosanquet’s philosophy of human agency, or as 
David Boucher calls it, ‘metaphysics of the person’ would be very helpful here, as this 
metaphysics also contains a significant common element of their moral philosophy.
32
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According to the two British idealists, individuals as they are at any given point in 
time are imperfect and incomplete. At any given point in time, their potential is not 
yet fulfilled, their capacities are not fully developed. That is why they are restless. 
Their capacity to be better combined with their current imperfection propels them, so 
to say, towards the pursuit of self-perfection. Our human nature is such that we tend 
to pursue self-realisation. The British idealists’ metaphysics of the person is the 
metaphysics of self-realisation. The pertinent observation here is that individuals, as 
they are, are imperfect, unrealised: they only acquire substance through their pursuit 
of realisation. This has moral implications. 
 
Self-realisation in itself combines a personal and a public goal: full deployment of 
one’s capacities, in personal plan, and dedication to the common good, in social plan. 
However, both self–perfection and the service to the common good imply 
preparedness to sacrifice one’s personal pleasures. These include desires that do not 
promote either our self-development or the common good, like selfish pursuits, 
laziness, or pleasure seeking. Green generally terms these ‘inclinations of the 
moment’ or ‘inclinations to pleasure’.33 Here is the place where Green’s and 
Bosanquet’s moral philosophy emerges out of their metaphysics of the person. If, 
according to their metaphysics of the person, we acquire our human essence through 
the pursuit of self-realisation, their moral philosophy spells out that self-realisation is 
achieved in the pursuit of the common good through personal effort that entails 
sacrifice of selfish pleasures. Moral action is based on ‘fundamental readiness to 
forgo pleasure for duty’.34 In the context of Green’s and Bosanquet’s moral 
philosophy, the common good overrides the personal good, narrowly conceived. Their 
moral philosophy is based on, what can be usefully termed, a ‘priority of duty’: the 
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idea that an action committed to the common good is always superior to an action that 
is indifferent or counterproductive to the common good. In the context of moral 
action, the common good supersedes in importance a narrowly conceived individual 
good: moral action is constituted by the sacrifice of the latter for the sake of the 
former.  
 
Bosanquet’s analysis of justice reveals that the demands of justice focus on 
individuality perceived in its own right. When we demand fair treatment we think of 
ourselves as individual human beings, not as citizens who have duties. And this is the 
paradox of justice – it seems to be a moral claim, yet it undercuts the backbone of 
morality: the ‘priority of duty’. Our vocation as human beings is to serve the 
community, while in claiming justice, we seem to do the opposite. We demand 
service from the community. 
 
The following quotation reveals the contrast between our sense of duty, on the one 
hand, and the claims for justice, on the other. The quotation is interesting because it 
offers a psychological portrait of the type of attitude that underpins Bosanquet’s moral 
philosophy: an attitude of wholehearted self-dedication to the public good. Here the 
term ‘ideal justice’ does not stand for what we usually understand by justice – as 
becomes clear at the end of the quotation. Indeed, the purpose is to show that if ‘ideal 
justice’ existed it would be the opposite of the conventional understanding, or what 
Bosanquet calls in the previous quotation ‘the maxims of common Justice’.35 
 
Ideal Justice, or the passion for social or human service, may know 
well enough the inequality it is imposing but it does not care to 
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insist upon it in presence of more important issues. If you can do it 
you must, never mind whether some one else could do it as well; 
and therefore, again, the man who recognises it finds its demand the 
hardest and sharpest claim he can conceive. His Ideal Justice holds 
that he has done nothing while there is anything left for him to do. 
We are unprofitable servants. But, then, with this you have given up 
what is peculiar in Justice. You have left the world of claims.
36
 
 
This is powerful rhetoric giving a vivid expression of Bosanquet’s vision of our moral 
constitution. Our only way of flourishing is by being as good as possible and that 
means giving as much as possible without claiming anything in return. ‘We are 
unprofitable servants.’ Morality is about unconditional giving. It is about spontaneous 
prioritising of the common good over a narrowly conceived personal good. As soon as 
we understand what justice is about, we are bound to see that it comes into conflict 
with our sense of our duty and of our public function. It comes into conflict with 
Green’s and Bosanquet’s metaphysics of the person and the moral philosophy implied 
in it. 
 
But this is not the end of the philosophical story of justice. In addition to ‘exposing’ 
the claims for justice and revealing their true ‘not enough publicly minded’ colours, 
Bosanquet offers a justification of this social ideal. This is a justification that may be 
somewhat morally shocking for us, who are well versed in the human rights 
narratives, yet logical in the context of the moral philosophy that we have discussed 
so far. The justification of the social ideal of justice is that even as separate and 
incomplete individuals, we are valuable. It is this incomplete individuality that we 
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actually sacrifice for the common good. The incomplete individual is the starting 
point of moral action. 
 
Justice is certainly not the highest point of view; but if it is in a 
sense the lowest of social claims, that is a way of saying that it is the 
basis of all social dealing. A universal human claim can be 
transformed by higher claims, but cannot be cancelled. Individual 
human beings have to be taken account of; each is one among 
others, having a bodily and spiritual life of his own, which cannot be 
genuinely sacrificed or surrendered unless it is first his own to 
sacrifice or surrender. 
37
 
 
The justification of the social ideal of justice relates to the fact that without 
individuals service to the common good is impossible. However incomplete and 
imperfect on their own, individuals are the agents who have to perform the mutually 
intertwined self-improvement and service to the common good. Self-sacrifice is 
impossible without the self, no matter how undeveloped this self is. In less dramatic 
terms, the same message comes from Green – people cannot give to society if they 
have nothing to give. You cannot expect moral commitment from destitute people.
38
 
 
What is morally unacceptable from our point of view is that individuals are seen as 
means to an end, as opposed to ends in themselves. This issue will be addressed in 
section four. However, there is an important philosophical point here. What 
Bosanquet spells out in claiming that you cannot sacrifice something that is not your 
own, is the significance of the imperfect individual. It is the imperfect individual – 
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that is all individuals at any given point in time – who performs the moral duty, the 
unprofitable service. If justice is the social ideal that looks after imperfect individuals, 
it is a very worthy social ideal as it equips them with things of their own. Although on 
our own we are imperfect, it is we as individuals who perform our duties. 
 
Hence, Bosanquet’s philosophical conclusion of the lecture is more even handed. His 
conclusion is not that justice is not sufficiently important, but that we face a tough 
moral dilemma. 
 
But, I repeat, I am not using these high principles to support one 
contention against the other, to advocate, i.e., the absolute State 
against simple human justice. I am using them only to illustrate the 
difficulty and urgency of the problem in which all social 
dissatisfaction probably has its root – the problem of simple 
individualistic justice over against the imperative of public 
welfare.
39
 
 
This is a strong statement in several aspects. Here Bosanquet comes to terms with one 
of the implications of his moral theory. On the face if it, his moral theory asserts the 
‘priority of duty’, the priority of the common good over the narrowly conceived 
personal good, the priority of public welfare over the wellbeing of the isolated 
individual. On analysis, however, it turns out that the individual – always incomplete 
in his state of isolation and imperfection – plays a fundamental role in the 
performance of moral action. So although justice is an individualistic and therefore 
inferior moral ideal, it is, on reflection, indispensable. 
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There is another conclusion that bears significantly on our perception of the British 
idealists’ social metaphysics. The British idealists, often called the British Hegelians, 
are traditionally accused of conflating the common and the personal good. This 
conflation has caused concerns among the liberal critics, as it was seen as indirectly 
undermining the personal good.
40
 Bosanquet’s analysis of justice makes it very clear 
that such conflation was not the case. He highlights a conflict between the interests of 
the individual and the interests of the community. In addition, he explains why there 
is no easy way of resolving the conflict in favour of one side or the other. Although 
his moral philosophy implies a solution in favour of the common good over the 
narrowly conceived individual good, his subsequent analysis reveals that the 
wellbeing of individuals is of vital concern. 
 
Bosanquet’s moral philosophy applied to the analysis of justice leads us to a moral 
dilemma. This dilemma is based on the realisation that ‘simple individualistic justice’ 
and ‘the imperative of public welfare’ exist in tension with each other, yet each makes 
a valid claim on our loyalty. What about solutions to the dilemma? There are two final 
messages in his lecture. The first is directed to the socialists and the working class 
activists who campaign for justice. To them Bosanquet says that they have to weigh 
the demands for justice against the demands for public welfare. There is however an 
internal message, so to say – a message about rethinking priorities within the moral 
philosophy of the British idealists. The lecture on justice started with the paradox of 
justice – the paradox being that justice is individualistic and as such heavily impeded 
in its capacity to make moral claims. The conclusion of the analysis, however, is that 
even if it is individualistic, justice is indispensable. What are the implications of this 
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discovery with respect to the ‘priority of duty’ and the priority of the common good 
over the narrowly conceived personal good? Don’t we need to revisit the British 
idealist moral philosophy and see what changes it will have to endure in order to 
accommodate the newly discovered significance of justice? 
 
I will now turn to Green’s theory of rights and demonstrate that with some 
reconstruction this theory can resolve Bosanquet’s moral dilemma. In other words, I 
demonstrate the capacity of the British idealist moral philosophy to offer a 
satisfactory - to our moral standards - justification of justice. The advantage of 
justifying justice on the grounds of British idealist ethics are to be found in the fact 
that we end up with a potentially useful notion of social justice as a dynamic relation 
between two groups of people: those who possess more power resources and those 
who are deprived of them. British idealist ethics offers us a binary relation model, 
which when understood could help us explain the kind of transactions that we seek in 
the pursuit of justice. 
 
3. Green on rights: why rights are ‘secondary’ to the promotion of the common 
good  
 
Green’s theory of rights seems more pragmatic, and less philosophical, than 
Bosanquet’s theory of justice. This pragmatism has proven to be attractive to 
contemporary theorists.
41
 Yet, this section will demonstrate that Green’s theory of 
rights can be fully understood only in conjunction with his moral philosophy.  
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Green starts with the observation that rights exist as given to us by society.
42
 His 
argument, as developed in the Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, aims 
to challenge natural rights theories. Rights are not pre-given, he argues, they are 
given. They do not belong to individuals on the strength of their unique divine or 
human constitution – they are social products. Rights can be seen as ‘natural’ to the 
extent that they contribute to the advancement of a common human end,
43
 or to the 
extent that they can come into conflict with unjust social practices. Yet they are not 
‘natural’ in the sense of being independent from society. Right are ‘ “natural” in the 
sense of being independent of, and in conflict with, the laws of the state in which 
[one] lives, but they are not independent of social relations.’44 Rights, Green famously 
argues, exist only as recognised by society. And society, through its practices or 
institutions, will recognise rights only if ‘there is some common consciousness of 
utility shared by the person making the claim and those on whom it is made’.45 This 
pragmatic, almost utilitarian, approach however is very strongly interconnected with 
Green’s moral philosophy which is not at all pragmatic or utilitarian. Let me reveal 
the logic underpinning this theory of rights, expose the universalist assertions it makes 
and, after some reconstruction, link those assertions to a morally defensible theory of 
justice. 
 
Green’s theory of rights can be explained as composed of several logical components, 
or logical steps. The first and in a sense the most important one is Green’s explanation 
of rights as products of moral transactions. This component will shortly receive more 
attention, but in a nutshell the idea is the following. We have rights because 
somebody else gives them to us. This somebody else, in the process of recognising 
our rights, acts as a moral agent. The second step of the theory is the observation that 
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moral action cannot be forced from outside. The third step follows from the second. 
Because the practice of rights cannot be enforced, our best chance of stimulating such 
a practice is by creating and maintaining communities where people would be 
motivated to voluntarily perform recognition of rights. Once we see the whole 
philosophical logic of Green’s rights theory as displayed in these steps, we will be 
able to address the concerns raised against it from a liberal point of view. We can see 
that the claim that rights are based on social recognition does not entail relativism and 
neglect of the value of the individual. In addition, we will be able to use Green’s 
moral theory in constructing a satisfactory justification of rights along the lines of 
asserting rights as ends in themselves. Let me go through each of the three 
components of Green’s rights theory in more detail. 
 
As outlined above, the first component of Green’s theory is to do with the idea that 
rights are outcomes of moral actions. According to Green, the process of ascribing 
rights is a process of recognising rights. There are two sides to this process. On the 
one hand, we have those who claim rights, and on the other hand, those who recognise 
these claims. Those who do the recognition of rights play a particularly important part 
as they are the ones who actively produce them, so to say. I have previously argued 
that for Green, the process of recognising rights amounts to, or exemplifies, moral 
action.
46
 Green does not flag this up often enough, and this must be one of the reasons 
why commentators have not picked up on this aspect of his rights theory.
47
 But the 
implications of the claim that the recognition of rights is a moral action are 
significant, as we shall see. The textual evidence in support of this interpretation is 
unambiguous: 
 
 22 
There ought to be rights, because the moral personality – the 
capacity on the part of an individual for making a common good his 
own – ought to be developed; and it is developed through rights; i.e. 
through the recognition by members of a society of powers in each 
other contributory to a common good and the regulation of those 
powers by that recognition.
48
 
 
Recognition of rights is part of moral action in the same way as the pursuit of the 
common good is. Looking after your fellow citizens is a form of contributing to the 
common good. Rights are ascriptions: they are an outcome of moral action. Spelling 
this out is important because it allows us to tap into the resources of Green’s moral 
philosophy and gain further understanding of his overall position. As already 
discussed in the section on Bosanquet, moral action implies overcoming narrowly 
personal interests in the name of contributing to a good which we hold in common 
with others. The process of recognising rights, as a moral process, implies an element 
of self-sacrifice. In this sense the person recognising rights has ontological priority 
over the person who claims these rights. Those who claim rights depend on those who 
recognise them: their status is secondary, not in mere practical terms but in moral 
terms as well. And as, usually, the perspective of justice is associated with the 
perspective of those who claim rights, justice is a secondary moral ideal. Although 
Green does not state this as explicitly as Bosanquet, his way of explaining rights 
asserts the moral priority of the rights recognisor over the rights claimant.
49
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The second element of the theory is that moral action cannot be imposed by other 
people – it can only be voluntarily undertaken by the moral agent himself. We cannot 
force others to recognise our rights – we can only hope that they will do so. 
This explains why, for Green, the performance of rights recognition cannot be 
imperative. Our rights are in the hands of others – hence the limits of our control over 
the implementation of rights. We, on the other hand, have full control, over our own 
duties. We can guarantee that these will be performed.  
 
In earlier work on Green’s rights I have criticised Green for an insufficient 
commitment to rights.
50
 I have observed the disparity between his treatment of our 
moral duty as something of primary significance, on the one side, and his treatment of 
rights, as something in the hands of social recognition, and therefore in the hands of 
convention, on the other side. The question raised was why rights were not as 
imperative as our duty to the common good. Now, I believe that there is a clear 
explanation of this disparity. Rights are not as imperative as our duties, because our 
rights are somebody else’s duties. As rights are usually seen from the perspective of 
the claimant, as such, they do not constitute duties but claims. From the first person 
point of view, as a claimant, I have no control over my rights. I cannot impose their 
performance on the others.  
 
Here the differences between Green’s position and the contemporary take on human 
rights is obvious. Now we could swiftly respond to this by saying that, if not us, then 
the state can impose the recognition of our rights. Once our rights acquire legal status, 
they can be enforced. But in saying this we would be taking an institutional approach 
to rights – an approach that, arguably, conceals the moral transaction that underpins 
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the practice of rights. The institutional approach is tempting and it is also available to 
us. My recommendation is that we pause longer before turning to it. I believe that we 
could gain by focusing on the nature of rights from the personal ethics perspective 
developed by Green. The personal ethics perspective reveals the secondary status of 
rights. Rights, as products of the moral actions of others, are not under our control. In 
order to have rights, we depend on other people’s good will. Although the state can 
play a much more significant role in the process of enforcing rights than Green 
acknowledges, his claim, that the state is a mediator rather than a key agency in a 
relation between the two parties of rights claimants and rights recognisers, still 
remains very strong. 
 
The third component of Green’s rights theory is the claim that the practice of rights is 
possible only within a community where people recognise each other as equals.
51
 I 
will look at this component in section five.  
 
Here I will turn to the implications of the first two components for the discussion of 
justice. If we think about Green’s theory of rights as explained so far, we can see that 
he brings us to the same opposition between claiming rights and doing service to 
society, as Bosanquet. Two differences are to be observed, however, one in favour of 
Green and one in favour of Bosanquet. First, unlike Bosanquet, Green manages to 
explain the pursuit of rights, and therefore justice, as a part of the common good.
52
 
The second difference is that, with Green, this opposition between claims and duties 
is a bit more disguised. This is a drawback as this also disguises to some extent the 
type of moral transaction that, with the help of the reconstruction offered here, aids us 
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in justifying social justice. Let me look more closely at the second of these 
differences. 
 
4. Reconstructing Green’s rights: why rights are ends in themselves 
 
So far we have established that both Bosanquet and Green give social justice a 
secondary status as a social ideal. Both philosophers offer strong reasons in support of 
justice, yet both fall short of our moral expectations of seeing rights or justice for 
individuals as something with fundamental political significance. Let me turn to the 
opposition between claims and duties, very clearly spelled out by Bosanquet and less 
so by Green. It takes some textual analysis of Green’s lectures in order to pick out that 
recognition of rights is a moral action, that we have two parties involved – those who 
claim and those who recognise, and that the status of giving/recognising rights is not 
the same as the status of receiving/claiming rights. These oppositions are to some 
extent disguised in the Lectures due to the ‘circular’ definition of rights offered by 
Green. Most of Green’s definitions of rights describe the two separate transactions of 
giving and receiving rights, but as will be shortly demonstrated, the two transactions 
are somehow conflated into one claim which in itself represents Green’s rights theory 
inaccurately and leads to a conclusion that is unsatisfactory from the contemporary 
moral point of view. I will give a number of quotations that demonstrate the 
circularity of Green’s definition of rights. My purpose here is to criticise the manner 
in which Green disguised the opposition between giving and receiving, so 
fundamental for his moral theory. Once I ‘expose’ Green for not being sufficiently 
open about the two moral transactions in his rights theory, I then suggest a way of 
justifying rights as ends in themselves. 
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Green’s definitions of rights are circular to the extent that often they consist of two 
identifiable sub-clauses. The first is that rights are powers that are given to the 
individual by a society and the second is that they are given to the individual on 
condition that he will then make use of them in his service to the common good. So 
on the one hand, rights are there to give individuals more powers. On the other hand, 
individuals will use these powers for service to the common good. 
 
‘A right is a power of which the exercise by the individual or by some body of men is 
recognised by society … as itself directly essential to a common good.’53  
 
The circularity is demonstrated here best: ‘A right is a power (of acting for his own 
ends – for what he conceives to be his own good) secured to the individual by the 
community, on the supposition that its exercise contributes to the good of the 
community.’54 
 
In some definitions, however, these two elements are conflated to the effect that the 
second element, about the conditionality of a right on one’s service to the common 
good, gains priority. The shorthand definition asserts that: 
 
‘A right is a power claimed as contributory to the common good.’55  
 
The conflation of the definition disguises the fact that in essence the practice of rights 
involves two reciprocal moral actions. As revealed in the full circular definition, the 
first is moral action of the person recognising the claimant’s right. And the second is 
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the expected moral action of the claimant who, once equipped with the powers of his 
recognised rights, contributes in his own turn to the common good. In the shorthand 
definition, Green conflates the two moral actions in one general message to the effect 
that ‘rights are justified on the grounds of being an essential component of moral 
action’. But whose moral action this is, remains vague. And when this vagueness is 
resolved by the shorthand definition according to which a ‘right is a power claimed as 
contributory to the common good’ we are faced with the somewhat disturbing 
conclusion that individuals and their rights are seen as valuable only if they serve the 
common good.  
 
The type of justification of human rights that we, the ‘post-UN Declaration of Human 
Rights’ citizens, would be satisfied with is a type of reasoning that would explain 
rights, and the individuals who claim rights, as ends in themselves. With Bosanquet as 
well as with Green, justice and rights are justified on the grounds that they are 
essential for the social welfare, but not on the grounds that they are ends in 
themselves.
56
 
 
A careful look at Green’s rights theory in conjunction with his moral theory would 
reveal that he is very close to offering such a justification. Green gives us the two 
perspectives involved in the practice of rights – if he drew his conclusions from both 
of them, as opposed to, from just one of them, he would have articulated the ‘rights as 
ends in themselves’ conclusion.  
 
As discussed earlier, there are two moral actions implied in the practice of rights: the 
moral action of the person or the group of people who recognise rights to the 
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claimants, and the potential moral action of the benefitted claimant who could now 
serve society with increased powers. Green draws his conclusions and the shorthand 
definition from the second perspective. In the context of the moral action of the rights 
recipient, she and her rights are instrumental to the common good. She and her rights 
are a means to a higher end – the good of the community. Green’s claim that ‘right is 
a power claimed as contributory to the common good’ – a claim that portrays rights as 
means to an end – is a claim based in the context of the above described moral action 
of the rights claimant.  
 
However, if Green were to extract a definition of rights in the context of the first 
moral action – the action of those who recognise rights – then he would have claimed 
that rights are an end in themselves. The recognition of rights is the unconditional aim 
of the person who sees his recognition of rights as part of his service to the common 
good. As outcomes of moral action, rights are ends in themselves. Rights are ends in 
themselves because this is how they are seen by those who recognise them. Green’s 
circular definition states that rights are recognised to the claimant only on condition of 
the claimants’ future service to the common good. But this ‘conditionality’ should not 
be allowed by Green’s own understanding of moral action. Moral action is based on 
unconditional service to the common good.
57
 This conditionality is precluded by 
Green’s belief that within the context of moral action we are prepared to sacrifice our 
narrowly conceived personal good. We do not serve the common good expecting 
personal benefits in return. This conditionality is clearly precluded by Bosanquet who 
defined our commitment to public welfare as unprofitable service. If Green were 
consistent with his theory that rights are outcomes of moral actions, he would not be 
able to claim that rights are recognised on condition of the claimant’s future 
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contribution to the common good. This is due to the unconditional nature of the 
service to the common good performed in the moral action. 
 
This reading of Green can be seen as controversial on two accounts. The first is that I 
overstate the extent to which Green makes rights conditional on future contribution to 
the common good.
58
 Yet even if this point is made in milder terms – that is, rights are 
given to individuals in the hope that they will engage with some service to society in 
future – the claim that rights are justified as means to the social wellbeing remains 
valid. However, one could challenge the conclusions reached here from the opposite 
perspective: the perspective of accepting Green’s justification of rights on the grounds 
of the claimants’ expected contribution to the common good. The question would be 
why the reconstruction offered here, explaining rights as ends in themselves, 
supersedes the former, the more standard, reading of Green’s theory. 59 It is not a 
matter of one reading superseding the other, but of offering a new reading that may 
prove useful. The reconstruction suggested here unlocks hitherto unused resources of 
the British idealists’ moral philosophy to address issues of rights and social justice, as 
we will see in the final section. 
 
5. Social justice, personal ethics and equality 
 
Let me turn back to the question raised at the outset of the paper, about the advantages 
of personal ethics for understanding social justice as well as for resolving the ills of 
social injustice. 
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The moral philosophy of Green and Bosanquet gives us a portrayal of moral action as 
an interaction between two parties: those who perform moral action and thus serve the 
good of others, and those who benefit from this moral action. In the context of 
discussing justice and rights, these two parties are the party of those who recognise 
the rights of others and the party of those who claim rights. Technically, we could 
belong to either party: however, the observation here is that in every single moral 
transaction we belong to only one of them. It is the personal ethics perspective that led 
to this way of explaining things. The above reflections on the British idealist 
‘metaphysics of the person’ helped us spell out this morphology of the moral 
transaction, so to say. What is potentially very useful to our discussion of social 
justice is that, we could apply this analysis not only to persons but also to social 
groups. Both Green and Bosanquet refer to groups as well as individuals.
60
 The 
question now is whether we have some more substantive information about the nature 
of these groups. The answer to this question is to be found in the afore mentioned 
third component of Green’s rights theory. 
 
According to Green, the practice of rights is only possible in a certain type of 
community where people see each other as equals and share a common consciousness 
of the common good. The necessity of such a community becomes obvious in the 
light of the fact that the recognition of rights cannot be enforced. The existence of 
such a community will be conducive to a reciprocal practice of recognising rights. It 
will give individuals the assurance that their moral action of recognising rights will be 
reciprocated by a similar moral action by the others.  
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What is of interest here is Green’s idea of equality in the context of recognising rights. 
Green makes two claims. First, that only in a social environment where people 
recognise each other as equals can we have the practice of mutual recognition of 
rights. But he also makes a second claim that is much more useful in terms of 
understanding the nature of the social interaction involved in rights recognition. He 
claims that recognising others as equals amounts to recognising them as rights-
holders.
61
 ‘But rights have no being except in a society of men recognising each other 
as isoi kai homoioi [equals]. They are constituted by that mutual recognition.’62 
 
In a similar manner, Green’s discussion of justice in Prolegomena to Ethics raises the 
issue of social equality. There, in the context of a chapter on the nature of the 
common good,
63
 Green brings up the difficult question about its scope: who are the 
people we are prepared to share a community with? Green’s clear message is that we 
have to be prepared to expand our horizons, engage beyond the boundaries of ‘race’, 
‘religion’ or ‘status’, and seek ‘universal human fellowship’.64 We have to make 
incremental steps towards social equality: ‘the practical value of man’s morality 
increases with the removal of limitations upon his view of the kind of humanity which 
constitutes a claim equal with his own’.65 
 
The idea that the process of recognising others as equal to us is constitutive of rights 
recognition, as well as of justice, has a lot of potential. Green explores in detail only 
one side of it, while I would like to look at the other side. Green looks at what it will 
take those who are in the vulnerable position of not having any rights –  slaves – to 
gain the status of equality. His answer is that they would have to demonstrate 
‘capability of living in a community’66 which goes together with the ability to engage 
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in the pursuit of a common good. It is of interest however to look at those who would 
recognise the slaves as equals. Who are those people and what kind of things would 
they have to do? We could construct a possible answer. These must be a group of 
people who already live in a community where the practice of recognising rights 
occurs and where people see each other as equal. This must be a group of people who 
enjoy the powers given to them by the ascription of rights – people with some 
established social status. 
 
On these grounds, we could describe the recognition of rights as a social outreach 
activity, where members of a group with an established social status are prepared to 
accept other people, who are not currently accepted as of equal social standing, as 
equal, i.e. as fellow members of their community. This is not a random outreach 
activity – it is directed towards those who have expressed the desire to enter the 
community in question and who are prepared to demonstrate commitment to a shared 
vision of common wellbeing. 
 
This is a rather general picture that will raise a number of legitimate questions, one of 
which is about the ways in which these social groups will change as a result of the 
pursuit of justice. Green’s expectation is that the aspiring group will have to prove its 
worth, while much less change is expected from the group with the established social 
status. Richter criticises Green for this inclination: ‘This persistent moralism applied 
to the disadvantaged classes led to the expectation that every act of justice or equality 
would produce a transformation which was not required from those holding wealth 
and advantage by birth or achievement in other classes’.67 Richter’s analysis gives 
support to my observation that Green’s rights theory explains justice both as a form of 
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upward social mobility, and as a relation between two groups of different social 
status. In defence of Green, we should say that he takes more than seriously the duties 
of the upper classes towards social justice. Green’s theory of positive freedom is one 
that builds on his commitment to social justice.
68
 This theory outlines the 
responsibilities of employers and landlords towards their employees and land 
tenants.
69
 
 
We can see how the personal ethics of the British idealists forms the foundation of 
claims about the nature of just relations between social groups. Justice, as well as the 
recognition of rights, obtains in the context of the right kind of relation between two 
social groups. They obtain when the group of those with established social status 
accept as equal those who aspire to similar status but have been denied access to it.
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Conclusion 
 
My desire to explain the contribution of Green and Bosanquet on social justice by 
reference to a contemporary understanding of social justice have resulted in a rather 
complex paper. But I hope that all the threads come together in the end, or at least all 
of them add up to a coherent and informative picture.  
 
The moral philosophy that underpinned Green’s and Bosanquet’s understanding of 
social justice offers a personal ethics approach as opposed, and in addition, to an 
institutional approach to social justice.  Green saw the state as ‘the sustainer and 
harmoniser of social relations’71 and the logic as well as the desirable form of these 
social relations were explained through the framework of his and Bosanquet’s moral 
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philosophy. This paper has explored the capacity of their personal ethics approach to 
explain relations not only between individuals but also between social groups. 
 
The institutional approach to justice has its disadvantages. Some of the limitations of 
state institutions to impose justice are due to the fact that the ‘oppressive’ social 
groups hold a lot of power in their hands to implement the changes conducive to 
social equality and justice respectively. A personal ethics approach taps in, more 
subtly than the institutional approach, into making a constructive use of this power, by 
encouraging the groups of the ‘oppressors’ to voluntarily improve the conditions of 
the ‘oppressed’ and thus raise their social status. An institutional approach would aim 
at a legal enforcement of rights and thus pay less attention to the possibility of 
persuading the oppressive groups to voluntarily recognise rights or act in favour of 
justice. British idealist perspective looks in a friendly manner towards the powerful – 
they should not be bullied into doing the right thing. The more subtle and useful 
outcome of this ‘friendly attitude’ is the form of recognition they give, through their 
moral theory, to those in possession of more social resources. If these people promote 
justice by empowering those with less social resources, they engage in moral action. 
And moral action is praiseworthy. This is the ‘carrot’ as opposed to the ‘stick’ 
approach to promoting social justice. 
 
The institutional approach to justice and rights has its attractions. A good legal system 
of rights enforced by state institutions could bring justice without relying on the good 
will of the powerful to devolve powers, on the one hand, and on the efforts of the 
powerless to demonstrate their capacity of serving the common good, on the other 
hand. But in taking this shortcut, the institutional approach conceals what is at stake in 
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the process of achieving social equality between two groups. It either pre-empts or 
disguises the moral action performed by those who recognise rights. And this moral 
action is very important as it provides the perspective that is crucial in justifying 
rights as ends in themselves. 
 
The British idealist personal ethics approach gives us an alternative path - to both the 
classical natural rights approach and the post-Rawlsian ‘priority of the right over the 
good’ approach72 – for justifying rights as ends in themselves. Their justification is 
not based on the assumption that the common good should never trump the personal 
right. If, anything, it is based on the opposite assumption – that in the context of moral 
action, the common good trumps the narrowly conceived personal good. What this 
paper has shown is the capacity of moral action, conceived in a British idealist 
manner, to yield recognition of rights. The practice of rights is not feasible unless 
some of us are prepared to act in a dutiful way – as Rawls would agree. Acting in a 
dutiful way, however, as Bosanquet spells out in psychological detail, is nothing short 
of unprofitable service. The only way in which some of us would have their rights 
recognised in an unconditional manner would be if others were prepared to recognise 
them in that manner. The underlying observation here, implicit in Green’s rights 
theory, and spelled out in the opening section of this paper, is that although the 
entitlement to rights is universal, the practice of rights takes place when one social 
groups already in possession of rights is prepared to recognise the same rights to 
another social group that claims them but is not yet in possession of them. 
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